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Debasing Demon
PATRICK BONDY AND J. ADAM CARTER
Trent University and University of Edinburgh
Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as
they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation,
not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a
thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one
from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The
“Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the truth condition on
knowledge, but via the basing condition. This demon can cause any belief to seem
like it’s held on a good basis, when it’s really held on a bad basis. Several recent
critics (Brueckner (2011), Conee (2015), Ballantyne & Evans (2013)) grant Schaffer the
possibility of such a debasing demon, and argue that the skeptical conclusion doesn’t
follow. By contrast, we argue that on any plausible account of the epistemic basing
relation, the “debasing demon” is impossible. Our argument for why this is so gestures,
more generally, to the importance of avoiding common traps by embracing mistaken
assumptions about what it takes for a belief to be based on a reason.
1. Introduction
Here is an epistemological platitude: the epistemic basing relation is the relation
which obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held, or be-
tween beliefs and the considerations or factors on which they are based. Here’s
another: a proposition p is justified for a subject S just in case S possesses good
epistemic reasons for believing p, whether or not S believes p on that basis (or
indeed, whether S believes p at all), while S’s belief that p is doxastically justified
(i.e. S’s belief is held in an epistemically permissible fashion) if and only if S be-
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lieves p in the right kind of way, on an epistemically appropriate basis. However,
although these platitudes are widely accepted, epistemologists have not arrived
at any kind of consensus about how to give a plausible, counterexample-free ac-
count of the basing relation. And until we can provide an acceptable account of
the basing relation, and bring it to the general epistemological consciousness, we
run the risk of going awry in our other projects both within epistemology and in
philosophy more generally, by assuming an incorrect picture of what it takes for
a belief to be based on a reason.
Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, we aim to address Jonathan Schaffer’s
(2010) recent suggestion that there is a sceptical scenario, involving a “debasing”
demon, that is even more powerful than Descartes’ evil demon scenario. Whereas
Descartes imagines a demon who could make just about any target belief false,
Schaffer imagines a demon who could cause any belief to seem like it’s held on
a good basis, when it’s really held on a bad basis. We will argue that on any
plausible account of the basing relation, Schaffer’s argument doesn’t go through.
Indeed, though other critics (Brueckner (2011), Conee (2015), Ballantyne & Evans
(2013)) grant Schaffer the possibility of a debasing demon, and argue that the
skeptical conclusion doesn’t follow, we argue that given any plausible account of
the basing relation, the debasing demon scenario isn’t even possible. And second:
in showing how Schaffer’s argument fails, we aim to illustrate the importance of
arriving at and employing a defensible account of the basing relation in our
epistemic theorizing.
2. Causal and Doxastic Theories of the Basing Relation
It’s natural to think that the basing relation must be some kind of causal relation.
After all, when we hold beliefs for reasons, the reasons are why we hold the
beliefs, and they’re what we would appeal to in order to defend our beliefs from
challenges—just as, when we perform an action for a reason, the reason is why
we performed the action, and what we would appeal to in defending the action
from challenges. So, presumably, if we weren’t in possession of the reasons, we
wouldn’t hold the beliefs or perform the actions in question. So two natural
accounts of the basing relation are:
Causal (Sustaining) Account of the Basing Relation: For S, p, reason R, S’s
belief that p is based on R iff S’s belief that p is causally sustained by
R.
Causal (History) Account of the Basing Relation: For S, p, reason R, S’s be-
lief that p is based on R iff R is part of the causal history leading up to S’s
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belief that p1.
A quick remark about these accounts: on the face of it, the causal-sustaining ac-
count is more plausible as an account of the basing relation than its causal-history
counterpart. For S might have formed the belief that p on the basis of a reason
R at a time t, and then at some later time t+n, S might forget about R, beyond
the possibility of recollection. Or S might come to explicitly change her mind
about whether R is a good reason for p, and thereby explicitly exclude R from
her reasons for believing p. Still, there are at least two reasons for considering a
causal-history account of the basing relation, in addition to a causal-sustaining
account, in this context. First: provided that S hasn’t explicitly ruled R out from
the set of reasons for which she believes p, R might still be part of a correct expla-
nation of why S holds the belief that p at t, and R might therefore help provide a
rational explanation of why S holds p at t, even if S has entirely forgotten about
R2. And second: we aim to respond to Schaffer’s debasing demon argument in
this paper—and although Schaffer doesn’t provide us with an account of the
basing relation, a causal-history account appears to be the account that is most
helpful for Schaffer’s case3.
Now, these two causal accounts are natural starting-points for an account
of the basing relation. But they are only starting-points, because as they stand,
they face convincing counterexamples of at least two kinds. The first kind of
counterexample involves deviant causal chains. For example, consider Alvin
Plantinga’s (1993) case:
Suddenly seeing Silvia, I form the belief that I see her; as a result, I
become rattled and drop my cup of tea, scalding my leg. I then form
the belief that my leg hurts; but though the former belief is a (part) cause
of the latter, it is not the case that I accept the latter on the evidential
basis of the former (1993: 69, n8).
This sort of case shows that something like a “non-deviant” clause would have to
be added to a flat-footed causal account of basing, in order for the account to be
plausible. But this is easier said than done. As Keith Allen Korcz (2015) suggests,
“it is quite difficult to clearly explain what non-deviant causation amounts to, yet
without such an explanation causal theories [of the basing relation] are ultimately
unsatisfactory” (2015: Section 1, 3).
1. Variations on causal theories accounts of the basing relation have been widely adopted,
and sometimes defended, by recent epistemologists, e.g., Harman (1970), Swain (1981)), Moser
(1989), Turri (2011), and McCain (2012).
2. See Bondy (forthcoming) for elaboration of causal history and sustaining accounts.
3. Some of Schaffer’s remarks indicate that he has a Causal (History) account in mind—e.g.
(2010: 232): to think that I can be certain that my beliefs have not been debased is “to suppose
that I have infallible access to some of the mental transitions in my past."
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A possible way to supplement the Causal (Sustaining) account, to avoid the
problem of causal deviance, is with Turri’s (2011) causal-manifestation condition:
R is among your reasons for believing Q if and only if R’s causing your belief
manifests (at least some of) your cognitive traits (2011: 393).
Turri takes the manifestation of a disposition to be an undefined primitive.
But we have a fairly good intuitive grasp on the concept, and we are able to
easily apply it in a range of cases. To borrow Turri’s (2011: 391) example, when
a microwave heats up and boils a cup of water in normal circumstances, the
microwave’s boiling the water manifests its power to heat things up. But when
a microwave malfunctions, sparks, causes a fire, and thereby boils the water, the
microwave’s boiling of the water doesn’t manifest its power to heat things up.
And it seems that, in the central causal deviance counterexamples, the belief
is caused or causally sustained by a reason, but the belief’s being caused by the
reason does not manifest a cognitive trait. In Plantinga’s case, his belief that he
sees Silvia is a cause of his later belief that his leg hurts, but that causal relation
does not manifest a cognitive trait. (There is a cognitive trait manifested: the
formation of the belief that his leg hurts manifests Plantinga’s disposition to
form the belief that he feels pain in a part of his body, when he is feeling pain in
that part of his body. But the fact that Plantinga’s belief that he sees Silvia is a
cause of his later belief that he feels pain in his leg does not manifest a cognitive
trait.)
So the options available for someone who wants to adopt a causal theory of
the basing relation are (1) simply stipulate that it’s non-deviant causal chains or
causal sustaining that establishes basing relations between beliefs and reasons
(which is quite unsatisfactory4), or (2) include something like Turri’s cognitive-
manifestation condition as a way to explain the non-deviance condition.
Causal deviance counterexamples are meant to show that R’s causing S’s
belief that p is not, by itself, sufficient for S’s belief that p to be based on R.
The second kind of counterexample is meant to show that causation isn’t even
necessary. The classic example is the superstitious-lawyer case5. The case is
somewhat complicated, but Kvanvig (1985) sums it up nicely:
The counterexample concerns a [sic. superstitious] lawyer who, like the
rest of his contemporaries, takes his client to be guilty. However, because
4. Compare here a non-deviance condition on a causal theory of basing with the suggestion
that knowledge must be ‘non-accidentally true belief’. As Zagzebski (1996) has noted, one
hasn’t offered, in the face of Gettier (1963), an illuminating account of propositional knowledge
by insisting that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. More accurately, this is a kind of
platitude which should guide our theorizing about knowledge. In a similar vein, the suggestion,
by a proponent of the causal account of the basing relation, that the kind of causation apposite
to basing must be non-deviant, should guide our theorizing about the basing relation.
5. Note that this particular case trades on harmful stereotypes which the authors do not
agree with.
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of his [sic. superstitious] nature, the lawyer is inclined to trust what the
tarot cards say, and upon learning that the tarot cards say that his client
is innocent, comes to believe that his client is innocent. What the tarot
cards say also prompts the lawyer to re-examine the evidence, which the
lawyer comes to recognize conclusively establishes that his client is in-
nocent. However, given his rather impressionable character, the lawyer
also realizes that were the sustaining power of the tarot cards removed,
the sway of public opinion would cause him to be unable to see that
the evidence establishes his client’s innocence. Nonetheless, the lawyer
now justifiably believes that his client is innocent on the basis of his ex-
amination of the evidence. But this examination of the evidence neither
prompts his belief that his client is innocent nor does it sustain his belief
that his client is innocent–his belief in what the tarot cards say holds the
dubious distinction of being responsible for both. (1985, 153-4)
Some causal theorists bite the bullet in response to this case, and say that the
lawyer isn’t after all justified (e.g., Audi (1983) and Turri (2011)). This is a biting
of the bullet, though, since it is very natural to think that the lawyer is justified
in his belief by the available evidence.
One possible way for causal theorists to try to accommodate superstitious-
lawyer cases is to add a “pseudo-overdetermination” condition to the account
(Swain (1981), Bondy (Forthcoming)). Pseudo-overdetermination is a kind of
counterfactual causal condition: S’s belief that p—sBp—is based on reason R if R
is not an actual cause of sBp, but in the close worlds where the actual cause of
sBp is absent, and where sBp and S possesses R, R is a cause of S’s belief.
It’s controversial whether this condition is plausible (indeed, it is widely re-
jected). But we will show, in Section 4, that even a causal account that includes a
pseudo-overdetermination condition will not save Schaffer’s case.
So we come to the other leading type of account of the basing relation, the
doxastic account. Doxastic accounts excise the need for a causal explanation
of basing by shifting the importance to facts about what we believe about our
evidence, as opposed to facts about what causes our beliefs. There are (at least)
two ways to invoke such meta-beliefs in the account of the basing relation.
Doxastic Account of the Basing Relation (Necessary): For S, p, reason R, S’s
belief that p is based on R only if S has a meta-belief to the effect that R
is a good reason to believe p.
Doxastic Account of the Basing Relation (Sufficient): For S, p, reason R, S’s
belief that p is based on R if S believes that R is a good reason to believe
p.
Audi (1982) holds a view like the (Necessary) version; Ginet (1985) proposes
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a view like the (Sufficient) version, in his criticism of reliabilism. The (Suffi-
cient) version is what is perhaps most naturally suggested by the case of the
superstitious-lawyer: the lawyer recognizes that he has good evidence for his
belief, and so—in spite of the fact that the evidence isn’t an actual cause of his
belief—we naturally want to say that he bases his belief on the evidence, and his
belief can therefore be doxastically justified.
There are important objections for both kinds of doxastic account6. However,
just as with the causal accounts, we can set aside the question of whether the
problems can be overcome, because even if the doxastic accounts can be made to
work, they both prevent Schaffer’s argument from going through.
3. Debasing Skepticism
Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has recently unveiled an epistemic demon with (he
claims) the potential to threaten scepticism on a scale greater than that which
Descartes himself conceived when conjuring his Deceiving Demon in the 17th
Century. Schaffer calls his allegedly more virulent demon the “Debasing De-
mon,” a demon that would threaten to undermine knowledge by attacking not
the truth condition (as did Descartes’ Deceiving Demon) but rather by attacking
the justification condition by way of the basing requirement. The basing require-
ment for knowledge stipulates that, in order for one to know some proposition
p, one must not only possess evidence for p, but also base one’s beliefs on that
evidence. Roughly, Schaffer’s Debasing Demon leads one to believe on the basis
6. One popular line of objection to doxastic accounts of the (Necessary) variety runs roughly
as follows: If this kind of account is correct, then young and uneducated people who lack
the concepts needed to form the appropriate meta-beliefs about their own reasons fail to base
their beliefs on reasons. But young and uneducated people without the possession of such
concepts can and do base their beliefs on reasons. Therefore, doxastic accounts are incorrect.
This objection is not unsurmountable. As Korcz (2006: Section 3) notes, one reply—a strain of
which can be found in Moser’s (1989) causal account—would be to opt for either an appropriate
meta belief or “some appropriate form of awareness that need not involve any particular fully
developed epistemic concept.” Moser calls such awareness “de re aware.” An objection to the
doxastic account to which an appeal to de re awareness is not useful is the objection that we
sometimes base beliefs on reasons of which we are entirely unaware. To use a familiar style of
example, in this case one we borrow from Peter Markie, take the proposition “The Battle of
Hastings occurred in 1066.” Plausibly I am justified in believing this proposition to be true.
Plausibly, justification requires proper basing. If doxastic accounts of the basing relation are
correct, I base this belief on reason R just when I have some meta-belief consisting in (roughly)
the claim that R is a good reason for believing what I do about the Battle of Hastings. But
I have no such meta-belief because I am unaware of what my reasons are for believing this
ubiquitous piece of common knowledge. An objection to the (Sufficient) variety of doxastic
account, due to Turri (2011), is that such accounts seem to rule out by definition the possibility
that S might think that R is a good reason for believing p, but nevertheless decide not to base
her belief that p on R. Such cases do seem to be possible.
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of a guess, and then later makes it seem to one that one had believed that propo-
sition on the basis of evidence7. What gives Schaffer the right to conjure such a
demon? As Schaffer (2010: 4) sees it, this right is afforded us once we grant three
seemingly uncontroversial claims:
(S1) Knowledge requires the production of belief, properly based on
the evidence.
(S2) Any belief can be produced on an improper basis.
(S3) It is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper
basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly
based on the evidence.
Schaffer contends that once (S1-S3) are granted, the inevitable upshot is a threat
of universal doubt. Here’s Schaffer (2010: 5):
Given (1-3), the following sort of doubt may arise. For any given belief,
the debasing demon may ensure that it was produced on an improper
basis (by (2)). She may then make it later seem to the believer as if he had
produced the belief properly (by (3)). And the result is that the believer
becomes debased, in that his belief fails to satisfy the basing requirement
for knowledge (as per (1)). So now I might wonder, do I actually know
that I have hands, or was I merely guessing?
First, a note is in order on the powerful scope of the challenge sketched here
by Schaffer. Consider, in comparison, the scope for scepticism threatened by
Descartes’ Deceiving Demon. Not all propositions, it turned out, fell within its
haunt. Most notably, knowledge of the proposition “I exist” did not appear to
be threatened by the Deceiving Demon, because existence is a precondition of
the very possibility of deception, and indeed of thought itself—a point Descartes
keenly observed:
I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as
much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as
I think that I am something. (1984: 17)
The impotency of the Deceiving Demon with respect to the cogito owes to the
fact that Deceiving Demon threatened the matter of whether we can know that
the truth condition for knowledge has been satisfied—and this is a condition we
can always already know a priori to be satisfied with respect to the cogito.
7. The debasing demon throws her victims into the belief state on an improper basis, while
leaving them with the impression as if they had proceeded properly. So, for instance, the
debasing demon might force me into believing that I have hands on the basis of a blind guess
or mere wishful thinking, while leaving me with the impression as if I had come to this belief
on the basis of the visual experience.
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Do we know similarly a priori that the basing relation is satisfied with respect
to the cogito (or any proposition, for that matter)? Perhaps not, and this is
why the Debasing Demon is supposed to be more powerful than the Deceiving
Demon: for any proposition p, I might have formed p on an improper basis, and
at the same time, believe (mistakenly) that the basis of p is sound.
Of course, to generate a sceptical conclusion from what Schaffer has pre-
sented here as merely an especially dangerous sceptical scenario, one must argue
for additional premises. In this case, the premises would be that:
(i) the Debasing scenario cannot be ruled out; and further,
(ii) that it is required for knowledge that we do so.
While Pritchard (2010)8 (among others) would probably deny (ii) on the
grounds that that knowledge only requires that we rule out what are plausibly
considered relevant alternatives, Schaffer appears to endorse (ii). He does not,
however, endorse (i)—or indeed, even wrestle with the matter of whether (i) is
true—and so the result of his argument should not be mistakenly thought to be
the explicit avowal of a skeptical conclusion.
It is instead a particularly strong (perhaps, maximally strong) sceptical sce-
nario, one that—if it holds—would threaten skepticism with an unrestricted
scope. That enough makes Schaffer’s scenario important and deserving of scrutiny:
after all, the plausibility of Schaffer’s case for such a scenario would provide
prima facie leverage for the skeptic who wishes to defend (i) and (ii), creating
an all-together more powerful sceptical argument than those that have been de-
fended against before.
4. Ruling out the debasing scenario: possibility
There are two key problems with the argument for debasing scepticism. The
first is that the scenario Schaffer imagines, where the demon causes us to form a
belief on the basis of a bad reason, and then later to think that the belief is held
on the basis of a good reason, isn’t even possible, at least on extant accounts of
the basing relation. We can establish this impossibility by reductio.
Suppose that the debasing demon scenario is possible. Then (i) there is a
possible world where a demon causes some subject S to believe p on the basis of
a bad reason R1 at time t. And (ii) at a later time t2 the demon makes S think
that his reason for believing p was a different good reason R29. And (iii) at t2,
8. For a useful discussion of relevant as opposed to irrelevant alternatives, see Pritchard
(2010); cf., Lewis (1996).
9. Schaffer does not make it explicit that S must think her reason for believing p must be a
specific reason R2; as Schaffer sets it up, the debasing demon could perhaps cause S’s belief
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it remains the case that S holds his belief only on the basis of R1, and not on
the basis of R2. (For if S believes p at t2 on the basis of both a good reason R2
and a bad reason R1, S’s belief is justified by R2, and can count as an item of
knowledge. So to be a sceptical scenario, the demon must make S believe p only
on the basis of R1.)
We can now consider each of the candidate accounts of the basing relation,
and show that none of them are consistent with all of (i)-(iii). So either we
need to find a new and improved account of the basing relation, which will be
consistent with (i)-(iii), or we should reject the supposition that the debasing
demon scenario is possible.
Doxastic (Sufficient)
According to the Doxastic (Sufficient) type of doxastic account, all it takes for
S’s belief that p to be held on the basis of a reason R is that S thinks that R is a
good reason for believing p. But it’s explicitly included in the description of the
debasing demon scenario that at t2, S comes to think that he holds his belief that
p on the basis of the good reason R2. So S thinks that R2 is a good reason for
believing p at t2. So according to Doxastic (Sufficient), S believes p on the basis
of R2 at t2.
Doxastic (Necessary)
According Doxastic (Necessary), in order for S believe that p on the basis of R, it
is necessary that S also believes that R is a good reason for p. But in the debasing
demon scenario, S does not think at t2 that R1 is a good reason for p. So according
to Doxastic (Necessary), at t2, S does not believe p on the basis of R1.
Causal (Sustaining)
According to Causal (Sustaining), as supplemented by the causal-manifestation
condition, S’s belief that p is based on R iff R is a causal sustainer of that be-
that p to be based on a bad reason R1 while leaving S with the nonspecific impression that
her belief that p is based on some good reason or other. But in order for the debasing demon
scenario to be a sceptical threat, it must apply not only to cases where S has the nonspecific
impression that there is some good basis or other for her belief that p; it must also apply in
cases where it seems to S that her belief that p is based on a specific good reason R2. And
this is no doubt what Schaffer has in mind anyway: for example, in explaining the debasing
demon possibility, he claims that “I could have come to the belief that I have hands on the
basis of wishful thinking, while having the false impression that I came to this belief on the
basis of visual evidence” (2010: 232, italics Schaffer’s). The visual evidence in question here is
the specific evidence of the visual impression of having hands, not a nonspecific impression
of having some evidence or other. (Thanks to a referee at American Philosophical Quarterly for
pressing this point.)
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lief, where R’s sustaining S’s belief manifests a cognitive trait of S’s. And in
the debasing demon scenario, the demon causes S to think that his belief that p
is based on R2 when in fact the demon makes it the case that S’s belief is sus-
tained by R1 and not by R2. But then R1’s being a sustainer of S’s belief does not
manifest a cognitive trait of S’s—R1 sustains S’s belief in a deviant manner. It
wouldn’t help Schaffer’s case, if we included a pseudo-overdetermination condi-
tion in the analysis of the basing relation. For one thing, R1 is already an actual
cause of S’s belief, and we do not need to look to the close worlds where the
actual causes of S’s belief that p are absent. And for another, if we add a pseudo-
overdetermination condition to the account, it turns out that S’s belief is based
on R2 at t2. For if we take away the actual cause of S’s belief that p (we take away
R1), but we hold constant that S believes that p and that S possesses R2, R2 will
be a cause of S’s belief.
Causal (History)
Causal (History), just like Causal (Sustaining), needs to be supplemented by a
condition like the causal-manifestation condition, in order to overcome the causal
deviance problem. So Causal (History) is inconsistent with the claim that the
demon caused S’s belief that p to be based on R1 at t1; that was a case of causal
deviance.
So it turns out that, given any of the candidate accounts of the basing relation,
the debasing demon scenario isn’t even possible. In the absence of an alternative
account of the basing relation, then, debasing scepticism is just a non-starter.
5. Basing and Justifying
Suppose you are asked why you believe p. You think about this, and put forward
a reason, R. What is the relationship between what you’ve just said, R, in justi-
fying your belief, p, and what it is on which you count as basing your belief, p?
As Adam Leite (2004) has rightly pointed out, both causal and doxastic accounts
of the basing relation answer this question in broadly the same way: the rela-
tionship is one of independence. He terms this widely presupposed picture the
Spectatorial Conception of the Basing Relation.
Spectatorial Conception: The facts which determine basing relations are
in place independently of the person’s attempt to formulate a justifica-
tion for her belief—her explicit deliberation, reasoning, or declaration of
reasons—and are not directly determined by any of this explicit delibera-
tive or justificatory activity.
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The Spectatorial Conception10 has been the dominant assumption in discus-
sions of the basing relation since Gilbert Harman’s influential 1970 paper “Knowl-
edge, Reasons and Causes”, in which Harman criticised11 what Leite notes as the
last strand of contrary thinking: Keith Lehrer’s (1965) Gettier-response paper in
which Lehrer defined basing in terms of what one would say to justify one’s
belief12.
For the last half-century, then, the overwhelming presumption has been that,
for the purposes of establishing the justifiedness of a given belief with reference
to basing, the activity of justifying is itself epistemically inert. The activity of
justifying has been thought of, to take Leite’s analogy, more akin to “showing or
reporting that one has won a game” as opposed to “achieving a checkmate.”
The Spectatorial Conception of the basing relation, in short, places a meta-
physical “wedge” between (i) the basing relation, and (ii) the activity of justifying,
by regarding “facts that determine basing relations [as] not directly determined
by ... explicit deliberative or justificatory activity.” The simple picture is:
Figure 1. Spectatorial Conception
Interestingly, it is precisely this “wedge” between justifying and basing which,
on the Spectatorial Conception, provides the conditions for the very possibility
10. Consider, as Leite does, William Alston’s (2005: 7) suggestion that “the state [pertaining
to being justified] is the more basic one, since the activity of justifying is an activity directed to
showing that a belief is in the state of being justified” (2005: 7). Even Robert Audi (1993), who
champions the doxastic account of the basing relation, holds this line firmly in his suggestion
that one’s being justified in a belief stands independent from any ability to justify the belief
(1993: 145).
11. Harman (1970) writes: “People often believe things for good reasons, which give them
knowledge, even though they cannot say what those reasons are ... In most cases a person is
unable to state his reasons in any sort of detail. At best he can give only the vaguest indication
of the reasons that convince him. It is only in rare cases that we can tell a person’s reasons
from what he can say about them. Indeed, it is doubtful that a person can ever fully identify
his reasons” (1970: 844). Harman adds further that “When a person wonders whether a
consideration represents one of his reasons, he wonders whether that consideration influenced
his conclusion. But that is to wonder whether it has anything to do with why he believes as he
does, with the explanation of his belief” (1970: 845).
12. Although Lehrer’s (1965) central objective in “Knowledge, Truth and Evidence” was to
argue for a fourth condition on knowledge, he claims early on in the paper, in his discussion of
the well-known Mr. Nogot and Mr. Havit case—that, as Leite notes “a belief is not based upon
particular reasons if the person would not appeal to those reasons to justify his belief.”
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for Schaffer’s debasing demon to operate. On this point, a brief analogy to the
Gettier problem is useful. As Zagzebski (1994) pointed out, the conditions for
the possibility of Gettier cases are furnished by the logical gap between justifi-
cation and truth; so long as justification doesn’t entail truth (viz., so long as the
satisfaction of these conditions are independent of one another), there is space to
construct Gettier cases.
Likewise, so long as the facts which determine basing relations are in place
independently of our activity of justifying, there is open space for Schaffer’s de-
mon, a demon which preys, epistemically speaking, on an independence between
(i) what your basis of your belief is and (ii) what you sincerely put forward as
the basis for your belief.
Famously, in the case of Gettier problems, simply closing the logical gap
is easier said than done. One can after all close this gap between justification
and truth only by eliminating the possibility of justified false beliefs13. Inter-
estingly, though, there is one way, intimated by Leite, to close the gap between
justifying and basing—a way which would effectively undercut the possibility
conditions for Schaffer’s debasing demon—with no such analogous negative the-
oretical costs. Simply close up the alleged independence between justifying and
basing by having facts about the latter depend in some significant way on facts
about the former. Consider the following picture, which we can call (in contrast
to the Spectatorial Conception) the Justificationist Conception, according to which
what you count as basing your belief on is fixed by the activity of justifying.
Figure 2. Justificationist Conception
We’ve already suggested (i.e., in Section 4) that, on extant proposals of the
basing relation, Schaffer’s debasing demon is a de facto impossibility. The Specta-
torial Conception is a precondition for the possibility of Schaffer’s demon. Thus,
if we have reason to prefer the Justificationist Conception to the Spectatorial
Conception, we have a further, principled reason to discount the possibility of
13. Zagzebski (1994: 72).
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Schaffer’s scenario. And moreover, we’ll have cause to rethink what is a founda-
tional assumption about basing that both causal and doxastic theorists take for
granted. Question: do we have reason to prefer the Justificationist Conception to
the Spectatorial Conception?
Here it is helpful to distinguish between what we can call strong and weak
versions of the Justificationist Conception.
Justificationist ConceptionStrong (JCStrong): For S, p, reason R, S’s belief that
p is based on R at t if, and only if, S sincerely declares R as S’s reason for
p at t.
Justificationist ConceptionWeak (JCWeak): For S, p, reason R, S’s belief that p
is based on R at t only if S sincerely declares R as S’s reason for p at t.
Though Leite himself defends a version of (JCStrong)14, all that’s really needed
to close off the possibility conditions for Schaffer’s demon is (JCWeak). And so
we can recast the question: do we have reason to prefer (JCWeak) to the (more
widely embraced) Spectatorial Conception? We want to conclude by sketching
two reasons in the affirmative.
The first is a twist on Leite’s normativity argument, which he appeals to in
defending a version of (JCStrong). But the argument can be redeployed as follows
to support (JCWeak) over the Spectatorial Conception. The argument begins with
the premise that when one sincerely declares, after reflection upon the available
reasons, “these are the reasons for my belief,” one is not merely issuing a hypoth-
esis (as one would be doing when offering an explanatory reason), but instead
taking up a normative position, one which opens us up to epistemic criticism and
further normative consequences15. If the Spectatorial Conception of the basing
relation is correct, then asserting one’s reasons for one’s belief is merely issuing a
hypothesis, not taking up a normative position. Therefore, contrary to the Spec-
tatorial Conception, justifying is not irrelevant to basing (even if, contra (JCStrong),
it is not exhaustive of basing). And if justifying is not irrelevant to basing, this is
better explained by (JCWeak) than it is by the Spectatorial Conception.
The second argument, which builds upon the first, has to do with cognitive
bias. Stipulate that S1 and S2 have all the same beliefs, but that they have ac-
quired these beliefs in a different order, so that S2 has learned about the total
occurrences of a crime, C, more recently than S1 has. Suppose further that S1
and S2 learn that a crime has just been committed. Plausibly—due to the avail-
14. See Leite (2004).
15. As Leite points out, there is something incoherent, or Moore-paradoxical, about sin-
cerely asserting that “q is the reason upon which my belief that p is based, but q is a lousy
reason for believing that p.”
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ability heuristic16 to which we can stipulate S1 and S2 are equally susceptible in
general—S2 is more likely to base his belief that the crime that has just been com-
mitted is C on his beliefs about the occurrence of C than S1 is. But this is better
explained by (JCWeak) than by the Spectatorial Conception. After all, the intuitive
difference between S1’s and S2’s basing in this circumstance is best explained by
S1 and S2 being inclined to offer different justifications than by a proposal (i.e.,
the Spectatorial Conception) on which the justifications they are inclined to offer
are themselves irrelevant to basing.
It’s worth emphasizing at this point that it’s possible for us to fail at the
activity of justifying our beliefs. When we sincerely affirm that our belief that
p is based on reason R, we take on a commitment to the goodness of R as a
reason for believing p. But of course it might turn out that R is a lousy reason
for p. So the claim that the activity of justifying is relevant to the basing relation
should not be read as the claim that the activity of successfully justifying is
what’s relevant to the basing relation; unjustified beliefs can be held on the basis
of reasons too.
Now, (JCWeak) is one half of the biconditional in Leite’s (JCStrong). (JCWeak)
closes off the possibility of the debasing demon scenario, because it entails that
at t1, S doesn’t believe on the basis of the bad reason R1. And (JCWeak) is in-
compatible with the Spectatorial Conception, because that was just the view that
facts about basing are independent of what a person would declare to be the
reasons on the basis of which she holds her beliefs. If in all cases where S’s
belief that p is held on the basis of reason R, S must sincerely declare R to be
a reason for which that belief is held, and S must thereby take on a normative
commitment to the quality of R as a reason for believing p, then the Spectatorial
Conception is entirely misguided. But, for anyone who thinks that there is some-
thing fundamentally right about what motivates the Spectatorial Conception, we
can consider also the other half of (JCStrong), which we might call “(JCWeak∗)”:
Justificationist ConceptionWeak∗ (JCWeak*): For S, p, reason R, S’s belief that
p is based on R at t if S sincerely declares R as S’s reason for p at t.
This principle also rules out the debasing demon, because it entails that at
t2, S believes that p on the basis of the good reason R217. And note that (JCWeak∗)
16. This is the well-documented tendency of individuals to overestimate the likelihood of
events which have been recently considered or stored in memory. See, for example, Tversky &
Kahneman (1973) for a representative discussion.
17. Could Schaffer’s demon simply make it falsely seem to us, at t, that we are sincerely
declaring R as our reason at t, when in fact we are not doing this? If so, does this undermine the
effectiveness of (JCWeak∗) as a means of closing off possibility conditions for Schaffer’s demon?
The answer, in both cases, is ‘no’. This is for two reasons, the first reason is definitional, the
second philosophical. Firstly, the definitional point is that Schaffer’s demon is clearly defined.
It is not a demon with the power to make all occurrent believings opaque to one, in such a way
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allows that, when S doesn’t have any declared opinion about her reasons for be-
lieving that p, the facts about what her belief is based on can be fixed by factors
independent of what S sincerely declares to be her reasons for believing that p.
So, although (JCWeak∗) is incompatible with the letter of the Spectatorial Concep-
tion (allowing, as it does, what a person declares about her reasons to directly
determine what her belief is actually based on), it is compatible with its spirit.
In particular, (JCWeak∗) allows small children and animals, who are presumably
too conceptually unsophisticated to be able to declare anything about and take
on commitments regarding the quality of the reasons for their beliefs, to never-
theless have reasons for their beliefs. And it allows that we sophisticated adults
can hold beliefs on the basis of reasons even when we are entirely unreflective
about the reasons for which we hold them. (JCWeak∗) simply claims that when
we make sincere declarations about the reasons for which we hold our beliefs,
that is an overriding factor, which establishes a basing relation. And just like
(JCWeak), (JCWeak∗) respects the intuition that when we make declarations about
our reasons, we take on normative commitments regarding the quality of our
reasons. But (JCWeak∗) should be palatable to those who are not willing to give
up on what motivates the Spectatorial Conception18.
6. Conclusion
Schaffer’s debasing skepticism argument offers a fascinating challenge, though
one which warrants an undercutting, rather than a rebutting, response. We’ve
argued that, at least on the most popular extant accounts of the basing relation—
that, for anything x which you think you are believing, at t, you might not be believing x at t. It
is not our objective to argue against the possibility of a demon with such a different power,
further to those Schaffer has invested in his own debasing demon. This brings us to our second
response. Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that Schaffer’s debasing demon actually
did have this further power, a power to—let’s say—blend appearance and reality throughout
the fabric of one’s cognitive life, so that one might always be wrong about what belief one
is having, what content one is declaring, etc. The demon, suppose, makes it seem to one, at
t, that one is sincerely declaring a reason, R, as one’s reason for p, at t, when in fact one is
not doing this. Note that even on this assumption, no important implication follows for the
point we’ve made about (JCWeak∗). This is because (JCWeak∗) is a claim about what sincerely
believing on a reason suffices for, namely basing. Even if—as would be if we were imperilled
by this further demon—we might be mistaken about what we sincerely believe, the proponent
of (JCWeak∗) can remind us that the claim advanced is about what follows from one’s actually
sincerely believing some reason is a reason for one’s belief. Put another way, (JCWeak∗) could be
true even if we could be mistaken about whether the antecedent holds. Thanks to a referee for
requesting further discussion on this point.
18. Thanks to Emma C. Gordon, Modesto Gómez Alonso, Benjamin Jarvis, Duncan Pritchard
and Kegan Shaw for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. The authors would
also like to thank a referee at American Philosophical Quarterly and the journal’s editor for
valuable input.
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viz., those canvassed in Section 2—the debasing demon scenario cannot possibly
get off the ground. We suggested, further, a plausible explanation for why the
debasing demon scenario seems nonetheless compelling. A condition for the
possibility of the debasing demon scenario is that facts which determine basing
relations are in place independently of an individual’s attempt to formulate a
justification for her belief. Leite (2004) calls this the Spectatorial Conception
of the basing relation, and it is one which is widely held by both proponents of
causal and doxastic accounts of basing. We concluded by challenging this picture
in favour of one according to which the activity of justifying is itself relevant to
basing. Schaffer’s debasing demon is not merely de facto impossible on extant
views but, moreover, will be impossible on any plausible account of the role of
justifying to basing.
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